Judicial Philanthropy Curbed: A New Statutory Scheme for Cumulative Injury Awards by Basile, Louis A.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 9 | Number 1 Article 8
1-1-1969
Judicial Philanthropy Curbed: A New Statutory
Scheme for Cumulative Injury Awards
Louis A. Basile
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Louis A. Basile, Comment, Judicial Philanthropy Curbed: A New Statutory Scheme for Cumulative Injury Awards, 9 Santa Clara
Lawyer 156 (1969).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/8
JUDICIAL PHILANTHROPY CURBED: A NEW
STATUTORY SCHEME FOR CUMULATIVE
INJURY AWARDS
While California courts have long harbored a penchant for re-
viewing workmen's compensation cases' the current generation of
decisions indicates that the acknowledged liberal trend is rapidly
accelerating. In the eight year period 1960-67, for example, the
Supreme Court of California reviewed twenty-six claims for com-
pensation and favored the employee in twenty decisions.2 The
courts' "incredible liberality of interpreting and applying the fair
provisions of a well-written statute" has often resulted in nullifying
legislative intent and granting the claimant the benefit of every
possible doubt about the facts.' Perhaps the best example of the
courts' philanthropic interpretations is a recent series of "cumulative
injury" cases.4 Collectively these decisions have classified similar
physical harms as either specific injuries,5 cumulative injuries,' or
occupational diseases 7 in the attempt to avoid the lapse of the limi-
tations period' or to qualify for subsequent injury benefits. In-
1 A noted commentator has remarked that, although California has enacted the
most restrictive workmen's compensation statutes in the country, its court decisions
on compensability are more liberal than any of the other states. 2 W. HANNA, CAL-
IFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 8.03(3)
(1967). In the thirteen years from 1941 to 1953, the courts issued seventy-six opinions
of which only twenty-one ran against the employee. Id. at § 8.03(1) n.2.
2 See, e.g., Zeeb v. WCAB, 67 Cal. 2d 496, 432 P.2d 361 (1967); McCoy v. IAC,
64 Cal. 2d 82, 410 P.2d 362 (1966); Walters v. IAC, 57 Cal. 2d 387, 369 P.2d 703
(1962) ; Fibreboard Paper Corp. v. IAC, 57 Cal. 2d 844, 372 P.2d 321 (1962) ; contra,
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. IAC, 54 Cal. 2d 740, 356 P.2d 182 (1960).
8 Hanna, California Workmen's Compensation 1918-1968: A Brief Review and
Evaluation, 3 LINCOLN LAW REV. 89, 96-97 (1967).
4 Dow Chemical Co. v. WCAB, 67 Cal. 2d 483, 432 P.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757
(1967); De Luna v. WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 271, 65 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968); Miller v.
WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 589, 65 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1968); Fruehauf Corp. v. WCAB, 68 A.C.
591, 440 P.2d 236, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968).
5 For purposes of workmen's compensation law a specific injury was unclassified
as such. An injury is defined as any injury or disease arising out of the employment.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West 1955).
6 An authority in the field of workmen's compensation has defined a cumulative
injury as that which may result from the accumulated effects of overwork or from
long-continued exposure to tension and strain. Where there is such an extended
exposure, the result is regarded as one continuous cumulative injury. 2 W. HANNA,
CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.01
(2)(c) (1967).
7 Although no concrete definition has ever existed for occupational disease, it is
generally considered to be any disease arising out of and occurring in the course of
employment and caused by the employment. CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF
THE BAR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 171 (1963).
8 In California, a disabled employee must file all claims for compensation within
one year from: The date of injury, the expiration of any period in which he received
disability payments, or the last furnishing of any benefits provided by way of medical
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dividually the courts have held: First, a cumulative injury occurs
subsequent to a previous, fully compensated specific injury, even
though the extent of the cumulative injury was, in fact, determined
prior to the specific injury; 1 second, a specific injury is just "a
mere exacerbation" indicative of a later cumulative injury and is
submerged in the cumulative injury;" lastly, a series of back strains
caused by heavy lifting is an occupational disease and the limita-
tions period does not commence until the claimant realizes the in-
dustrial origin of his "disease."' 2
In swift riposte the legislature passed three statutes13 reversing
these recent cumulative injury and occupational disease cases.' 4
Unfortunately, both the court of appeal and the legislature appear
to have misinterpreted the first case' 5 handed down by the supreme
court. Thus, some ambiguity may remain despite the legislative
effort. However, the statutory clarification may be welcomed solely
for its apparent declaration of legislative policy.
This comment will examine the recent case and statutory law
involving cumulative injuries and analyze the clash between judicial
and legislative policy. Whether the legislature's apparent policy
declaration will dampen the liberal spirit of the courts remains to
be seen.
JUDICIAL PHILANTHROPY: RECENT CUMULATIVE INJURY CASES
While the "continuous cumulative" or "repetitive trauma" in-
jury has long been recognized in California, 6 this problematical
or hospital treatment. CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405 (West 1955). The date of injury is that
date on which occurred the incident or exposure for which the employee seeks com-
pensation. CAL. LAB. CODE § 5411 (West 1955). In cases of occupational disease, the
date of injury is the date when the employee first suffers disability and knows or
should know that his disability was caused by his employment. CAL. LAB. CODE § 5412
(West 1955). The case law has added the further stipulation that in the event that
an injury is cumulative in nature, the date of injury is deemed to be the date of last
exposure, that is, the last day of work or the last day the employee was exposed to
the elements causing the injury. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co. v. IAC, 39 Cal. 2d 831,
250 P.2d 148 (1952) ; Beveridge v. IAC, 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545 (1959).
9 CAL. LAB. CODE § 4750 (West 1955), CAL. LAB. CODE § 4751 (West Supp. 1967).
10 Dow Chemical Co. v. WCAB, 67 Cal. 2d 483, 432 P.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757
(1967).
11 De Luna v. WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 271, 65 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968); Miller v.
WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 589, 65 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1968).
12 Fruehauf Corp. v. WCAB, 68 A.C. 591, 440 P.2d 236, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164
(1968).
13 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 0000, 0000, 0000 (1968), as amended, A.B. 1, 1968 Cal.
Stats. 1st Extra. Sess. 1. (Hereinafter, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3208.1-2, 5303 (new).)
14 [1968] ASSEMBLY JOUR. 1st Extra. Sess. 11.
15 Dow Chemical Co. v. WCAB, 67 Cal. 2d 483, 432 P.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757
(1967).
16 See Swezey, Disease as Industrial Injury in California, 7 SANTA CLARA LAw.
205, 215 (1967).
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area was revived in Beveridge v. Industrial Accident Commission17
where the court attempted to put to rest the issue of when the so-
called "cumulative injury" occurred for purposes of the statute of
limitations. The case held that a cumulative injury, for example,
a series of minor back strains symptomatic of and resulting in a
disabling back injury, occurs on the date of last exposure, when
the cumulative effect causes disability.' 8
Dow Chemical
In Dow Chemical Company v. Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board,19 the claimant suffered back pains caused by lifting
heavy equipment. He had suffered specific injuries in 1949, 1960, and
1961, which had left him partially disabled. After leaving his em-
ployment on January 2, 1964 because of the severity of his back
injury, he filed claims for disability benefits for the 1949, 1960, and
1961 injuries. This claim was filed April 22, 1965. Claimant, on
September 17, 1965, filed another claim alleging permanent dis-
ability caused by repetitive trauma from the day he began work
in 1946 to January, 1964. The appeals board held: Claimant was
not entitled to an award for the 1949 injury; the 1960 injury con-
stituted 10% of his permanent disability which totalled 75%, hence
7Y2 % of the permanent disability; the 1961 injury also constituted
10% of claimant's total disability of 75%, hence 7Y2% permanent
disability; and finally, the cumulative injury constituted 80% of the
total disability of 75% and that this equaled 60% of the permanent
disability. The board measured the cumulative injury from 1946
to 1960. It then granted a rehearing on the cumulative injury and
held that the 15% permanent disability due to the combined effect
of the 1960 and 1961 injuries and the 60% permanent disability
due to the cumulative injury entitled claimant to the weekly life
pension provided by section 4658 of the Labor Code since his total
disability exceeded 70%.2o On appeal, the supreme court annulled
the board's decision and held tlat the 1960 and 1961 specific in-
juries could not be submerged into the 1946-60 cumulative injury
since awards had already been made for the specific injuries at the
first hearing, thus rendering their compensability res judicata. How-
ever, the court further decided that, although the cumulative injury
was measured from 1946 to 1960, the date of that injury for pur-
17 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545 (1959).
18 Id. at 595, 346 P.2d at 547.
19 67 Cal. 2d 483, 432 P.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967).
20 CAL. LAB. CODE § 4658 (West Supp. 1967). Any injury causing permanent
disability of 70% or more entitles the injured employee to a life pension based on a
percentage of his weekly earnings prior to such injury.
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poses of the subsequent injury statutes21 must be 1964. The court
rationalized that any other result would be unfair to the claimant,
since the evidence showed that 50% of his total disability occurred
prior to 1960, and that by deducting this 50% and the 15% due
to the 1960 and 1961 injuries, only 10% of the permanent disability
would have been caused by subsequent injury. Hence, the claimant
would not have been entitled to the section 4751 life pension.
The significance of Dow Chemical is that for purposes of the
subsequent injuries statutes, the court will apply the principle of
Beveridge, that a cumulative injury is deemed to have occurred on
the date of disability (here 1964) although, in reality, it occurred
prior to such disability (here 1946 to 1960). The court specifically
declined to merge the 1960 and 1961 specific injuries into the cumu-
lative injury. Dow Chemical apparently stands for a simple exten-
sion of the Beveridge principle in subsequent injury cases. Yet later
cases cite Dow Chemical as authority for conclusions inconsistent
with the Dow rationale. Such authority is more imaginary than real.
De Luna and Miller
In De Luna v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,22 the
employee suffered a specific injury on July 16, 1962. In 1966, he
filed for compensation alleging the specific injury of 1962 and a
cumulative injury dating from 1960 to 1966. The appeals board
held that the specific injury suffered by the claimant was barred by
the statute of limitations. 2' The court of appeals vacated the
board's decision and held that the specific injury of 1962 should
have been considered an integral part of the cumulative injury
claim.24 Moreover, the court held that since the employee filed his
claim for cumulative injury within the time allowable, that is, within
one year from the date of disability, 25 the statute of limitations did
not bar his claim.
The court's interpretation of the specific injury in De Luna has
a two-fold effect: First, by holding that the specific injury of 1962
was an integral part of the cumulative injury, the court allowed
litigation on a claim which would have been barred by the statute
of limitations; second, by holding that the 1962 claim was not
barred, the court allowed the claimant, upon rehearing, the possi-
bility of recovering compensation above that which he would have
21 CAL. LAB. CODE § 4750 (West 1955), CAL. LAB. CODE § 4751 (West Supp. 1967).
22 258 A.C.A. 271, 65 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968).
23 CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405 (West 1955). See note 8 supra.
24 De Luna v. WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 271, 276, 65 Cal. Rptr. 421, 425 (1968).
25 CAL. LAB. CODE §-5405 (West. 1955):.
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received, had only the cumulative injury been litigated. The very
essence of the De Luna holding is that the court has allowed the
specific injury of 1962 to be merged into the cumulative injury of
1966-a result emphatically rejected by the supreme court in Dow
Chemical.
In Miller v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,26 the
claimant alleged that he suffered injuries from slipping on a piece
of wet steel in 1956, lifting a 100 gallon tank in 1957, handling
large boilers in 1958, stepping in a hole in 1960, and handling fifty
gallon boilers in 1965 which increased the pain in his back. The
claimant filed two claims on April 27, 1966: One alleging a hip and
back injury in 1956; the other alleging a back injury in 1957 and
that the date of treatment for such injury was May 11, 1966. On
June 16, 1966, he filed two additional claims: One alleging cumu-
lative injury from September 24, 1957 through June 10, 1966; the
other alleging a back injury between May 20 and May 25, 1965.
After reconsideration, the appeals board held: The 1.956 injury
was not disabling; the 1957 injury was barred by the statute of
limitations; and the cumulative injury did not exist. However, it
issued an award for the 1965 injury based on 6% total disability.
The court of appeal annulled the appeals board's decision and
held:
[T]hat under the rationale of Beveridge and Dow Chemical the board
should have viewed the specific injury of September 19, 1957 as the
first of the many exacerbations causing the cumulative injury, and
should have taken that injury into consideration in determining whether
the applicant sustained a cumulative injury which had its inception on
that date.27
The court employed the Beveridge principle in finding that
the claimant suffered a cumulative injury, and also relied on Dow
Chemical in determining that the claimant suffered a cumulative
injury commencing on September 19, 1957.28 To support the latter
conclusion, the court relied on the following language in Dow
Chemical: "If the board is permitted to carve up the cumulative
injury into segments the results would be unfair."2 The Dow
Chemical court did not use this argument for the premise that a
specific injury should be considered one of many exacerbations
causing a cumulative injury." That court clearly stated that "[a] ny
26 258 A.C.A. 589, 65 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1968).
27 Id. at 596, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
28 Id. at 594-95, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
29 Id. at 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
30 Dow Chemical held that to allow the cumulative injury to be carved up into
segments would have deprived the claimant of recovery under the subsequent injury
statutes.
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injury which in itself produces a definable disability should not be
submerged into a series of injuries with an award granted for repeti-
tive trauma."'" Here the injury of 1957 was a definable disability
since both the appeals board and the court recognized it as such.32
Consequently, it seems that the court in Miller misunderstood
the language of Dow Chemical. More significant is the fact that the
supreme court seems satisfied with this interpretation of Dow Chem-
ical, since it denied hearing the Miller case.'3
The court of appeal also found error in apportioning disability
for the 1965 injury at 6%. This figure, based upon the first finding
of the appeals board, was adopted by the referee during reconsidera-
tion by the board and an award was made accordingly. In declaring
this award to be error, the court reasoned that in considering claims
for cumulative injury which overlap claims of specific injuries, all
claims must be considered as one cause of action and must be de-
termined during one proceeding.
In summary, Miller, like De Luna, held that a series of injuries
suffered by an employee can merge into one continuous cumulative
injury; and the date of such cumulative injury shall be the date the
employee was disabled. Miller further held that all questions of dis-
ability apportionment resulting from each injury and contributing
to the cumulative injury are to be considered as one cause of action
during one proceeding.
Fruehauf
The Fruehauf Corporation v. Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board"4 case also presents a problem in applying the statute
of limitations and determining the relevant date of injury. During
the period of his employment, from July 21, 1962 to July 5, 1964,
the claimant was required to lift heavy weights up to 80 pounds. In
September 1963 he began to experience pains in his back, and
thereafter left work for one month pursuant to his doctor's recom-
mendation. On July 2, 1964 he consulted another doctor who recom-
mended his hospitalization. Subsequently, doctors performed an
operation on his back which required the removal of intervertebral
discs. The doctor informed the claimant in October 1964 that his
disability resulted from his work. The claimant filed for compensa-
tion benefits on July 12, 1965, more than one year from the date
31 Dow Chemical Co. v. WCAB, 67 Cal. 2d 483, 492, 432 P.2d 365, 371, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 757, 763 (1967), quoting James v. Republic Indem. Co., 28 CCC 28, 31 (1963).32 Miller v. WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 589, 596, 65 Cal. Rptr. 835, 839 (1968).
'3 The supreme court denied hearing on the Miller case April 10, 1968. Miller v.
WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 589, 65 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1968).
34 68 A.C. 591, 440 P.2d 236, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968).
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of his disability, which the court recognized to have occurred on
July 2, 1.964. 35 In affirming the decision of the appeals board, the
supreme court decided that the claimant was suffering from an
occupational disease. Furthermore, it found that the claim was
filed within one year from both the date when the disability oc-
curred, and the time when the claimant learned that the disability
was caused by his employment. The date of injury was determined
by applying the rule in Marsh v. Industrial Accident Commission,
36
which was later codified in section 5412 of the Labor Code.3
7
Although the court applied the date of injury for occupational
disease, it recognized that the injury resulted from continuous cumu-
lative traumatic injuries. There is substantial authority concerning
the classification of occupational diseases and cumulative injuries.38
However, the guidelines used to distinguish the two are quite vague.
Despite the equivocal definitions of the authorities, the court in
Fruehauf flatly stated, "[I] t was the legislature's intention to clas-
sify injuries resulting from continuous cumulative traumas which
are minor in themselves but eventually result in disability as occupa-
tional diseases." 39 The court then cited Dow Chemical for the
proposition that the earliest date on which the limitations period
could commence was the date of disability in the case where the
employee suffers injury from cumulative traumas or exposures.
Finally, the court added the Marsh doctrine to this, and concluded
that before the statute of limitations can run, the employee must
be aware that his disability was of industrial origin.
40
The end result of Fruehauf indicates that the court allowed
recovery for an injury not unlike those injuries in Dow Chemical
and Miller, that is, injuries caused by continually lifting heavy
equipment. But here, the injury was classified as an occupational
disease. Had the court found that this injury was a cumulative
injury, as in Dow Chemical and Miller, the claimant would not have
recovered. The court's intent to decide in the employee's favor at
any cost seems incredibly clear.
LEGISLATIVE REACTION: 1968 LABOR CODE AMENDMENTS
While the overall impact of the 1968 statutory changes on
judicial policy appears uncertain, nevertheless the legislature's de-
35 Id. at 594, 440 P.2d at 238.
36 217 Cal. 338, I8 P.2d 933 (1933).
3T CAL. LAB. CODE § 5412 (West 1955). See note 8 supra.
38 See Swezey, Disease as Industrial Injury in California, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW.
205, 215 (1967).
39 Fruehauf Corp. y. WCAB, 68 A.C. 591, 598, 440 P.2d 236, 240, 68 Cal. Rptr.
164, 168 (1968).
40 Id. at 599, 440 P.2d at 241, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 169 (1968).
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sire to overrule the Dow quartet is definite.4 Although the ultimate
concern of those cases was preventing the limitations period from
running, the new statutes are directed toward eliminating the theories
which implemented that concern.
Classification of Injuries
Effective January 1, 1969, an injury arising out of an employ-
ment will be either specific or cumulative. Under Labor Code sec-
tion 3208.1, an injury is specific when it results from one incident
or exposure causing either disability or need for medical treatment; 42
the injury is cumulative when it occurs as a result of mentally or
physically traumatic activities extending over a period of time, the
combined effect of which causes any disability or need for medical
treatment. The date of cumulative injury shall be the date of dis-
ability caused thereby.4 Labor Code section 3208.2 provides that,
when disability, need for medical treatment, or death results from
the combined effect of two or more injuries, all questions of fact and
law are to be determined separately with respect to each injury, in-
cluding apportionment between such injuries, liability for disability
benefits, and costs of medical treatment.44 The effect of these new
statutes is to extend and clarify section 3208 of the Labor Code,
which defines "injury" to be any injury or disease arising out of the
employment. 45
Reading section 3208.1 (a) in the light of section 5411, the date
of specific injury has not changed.46 The "incident or exposure"
causing injury remains the criterion for the date of injury. However,
the "incident or exposure" criterion is now qualified in that it must
be such as to cause disability or result in need for medical treatment.
Taking alone the qualification of disability, the "incident or ex-
posure" causing such disability should depend on interpretation of
established definitions of disability. One authority has defined dis-
ability as "an impairment of bodily function caused by industrial
injury," and it also requires the impairment of earning capacity to
be compensable.47 As for the qualification that the "incident or ex-
posure" must result in need for medical treatment, this is apparently
41 [1968] ASSEMBLY JOUR. 1st Extra. Sess. 11.
42 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1(a) (New).
43 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1(b) (New).
44 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.2 (New).
45 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West 1955).
46 The reason is that under § 3208.1(a) a specific injury is the result of one
"incident or exposure" causing the disability, and under § 5411 the date of injury is
the date of the alleged "incident or exposure" for the consequences of which compen-
sation is claimed.
47 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 13.01(1) (1967).
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a question of fact. Whether one is in need of medical treatment is a
question which could better be answered by doctors or specialists,
after reviewing the facts of a given injury and observing the extent
of the injury.48
The Fruehauf case dealt basically with the problem of classify-
ing an injury. The court recognized that the injury resulted from
continuous cumulative traumatic incidents, and decided that the
legislature's intention was to classify such injuries as occupational
diseases.49 Although the courts should liberally construe workmen's
compensation law in favor of the employee,5° it would appear that
the Fruehauf court broke all precedent in stretching this policy of
liberal construction to find that the claimant's injury was an occupa-
tional disease.5
Section 3208.1 (b) should preclude a decision such as Frue-
haul. Analyzing the statutory definition of cumulative injuries,52
there are three requirements which must be met for cumulative injury
to occur: First, there must be a mentally or physically traumatic
activity; second, it must extend over a period of time; and finally,
it must result in disability or need for medical treatment. In
Fruehauf, the activities complained of extended over the period of
time in which he was employed, from July 21, 1962 to July 5, 1964.
Furthermore, the claimant suffered a disability which did require
medical treatment-the operation requiring the removal of three
intervertebral discs. The first requirement of traumatic activity sug-
gests an intention to create a technical definition.53 Trauma is de-
fined as "an injury or wound to a living body caused by the applica-
tion of external force or violence. ' 54 Apparently the tension and
strain involved in lifting heavy weights results from the external
application of force on the human body. Therefore, the lifting itself
48 The limitations period would then commence after the last furnishing of
medical treatment. CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405 (West 1955).
49 Fruehauf Corp. v. WCAB, 68 A.C. 591, 598, 440 P.2d 236, 240, 68 Cal. Rptr.
164, 168 (1968).
50 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1955).
51 In the case of Argonaut Ins. Co. v. IAC, 231 Cal. App. 2d 111, 41 Cal. Rptr.
628 (1964), a factual situation is presented not unlike the facts in Fruehauf. There
the claimant was a construction worker who engaged in labor which demanded lifting
heavy equipment. The injury he suffered- required an operation in which two inter-
vertebral discs were removed from his back. The court affirmed the determination of
the IAC which held such disability of the claimant to be a cumulative injury. Yet in
the face of the Argonaut case and others quite similar, the Fruehauf court held that
the claimant's injury was an occupational disease.
52 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1(b) (New).
53 Warren Hanna notes that the only distinction is in the pathology involved.
2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EmPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S, COMPEN-
SATION § 11.01(2)(c) n.18 (1967).
54 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2432 (1966).
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is a traumatic activity. It follows that under section 3208.1 the
injury in Fruehauf must be considered a cumulative injury. This
construction would have compelled the court to apply the date of
cumulative injury which is now the date of disability.55 Since the
date of disability occurred on July 2, 1964, the statute of limitations
would have run out on July 2, 1965. Hence, the claim filed on July
5, 1965 would have been barred.
The Last Exposure Rule
The new statutes distinguish the cumulative injury from the
specific injury in that the former occurs as mentally or physically
traumatic activities extending over a period of time. Although the
test of possible compensability in each type of injury is still whether
it causes disability or results in need for medical treatment, the
date of cumulative injury is different than the date of specific injury.
Formerly, the date of injury for a cumulative injury was the
date of last exposure,5 which courts have sometimes interpreted to
mean the date of disability." Under the new statute, the date of
cumulative injury will be the date of disability exclusively. The last
exposure rule appears to be no longer applicable as a device to as-
certain the date of injury. In most situations the date of last
exposure and the date of disability will concur.
The Integration Theory
Under section 5303 of the Labor Code, only one cause of action
can exist for each injury. However, any or all claims arising from
that injury may be joined in the same proceeding.5" The legislature
has added to this section the stipulation that no injury shall merge
into or form part of another. Also, no award for a cumulative injury
can include disability caused by any other injury which causes or
contributes to the existing disability.59
This addition to section 5303 appears to be a direct legislative
attack on the Miller and De Luna cases. In De Luna the court ruled
that the specific injury of July 16, 1962 should have been considered
as an integral part of the claim for cumulative injuries.0 This ruling
could not stand under the new statutes. Since the injury of 1962 was
55 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1(b) (New).
56 Firemen's Fund Indemn. Co. v. IAC, 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952).
57 Beveridge v. IAC, 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545 (1959).
58 CAL. LAB. CODE § 5303 (West Supp. 1967).
59 CAL. LAB. CODE § 5303 (New).
60 De Luna v. WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 271, 276, 65 Cal. Rptr. 421, 425 (1968).
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an incident or exposure causing the need for medical treatment,61
and since it did not appear to result from repetitive mentally or
physically traumatic activities," the injury must now be classified
as specific. 3 The treatment which the claimant received for that
injury lasted for one month, ending August 16, 1962. By application
of the one year statute of limitations,64 the time period within which
he could have filed for compensation pertaining to that specific
injury could not have exceeded August 16, 1963. Thus the claim
filed in 1966 would have been barred.
Nothwithstanding the bar of that claim, the argument remains
that the injury itself could still be considered as an integral part of
the cumulative injury claim. 5 However, section 3208.2 requires that
all questions of fact and law be separately determined with respect
to each injury. As a question of law, the injury of July 16, 1962 is a
specific injury within the meaning of section 3208.1 (a). Determin-
ing that injury separately, the statute of limitations bars that claim.
Any award granted to the claimant for the cumulative injury cannot
take into consideration disability caused by the specific injury.
Furthermore, section 5303 provides that one injury cannot merge
into or form part of a cumulative injury; hence, the incident causing
the specific injury of 1962 cannot be considered an integral part of
the cumulative injury. Therefore, under the De Luna facts, a claim-
ant could now recover an award based solely on the cumulative in-
jury of 1966, and that award would require the exclusion of any
disability caused by the barred specific injury of 1962.
In Miller, the court's finding was two-fold. First, the alleged
specific injuries of 1957 and 1965 contributed to one cumulative
injury beginning in 1957. Second, the date of the alleged cumulative
injury is the date on which the claimant last received treatment,
1966. The court then ordered the appeals board to "redetermine the
three claims involved in one proceeding as a claim for disability
benefits for cumulative injury commencing September 19, 1957 ."6
The findings of fact as stated by the referee are that those
injuries contributing to disability were the injury of 1957, rated at
21%% permanent disability, the injury of 1965, rated at 6% per-
manent disability, and cumulative injury rated at 12Y % permanent
61 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1(a) (New).
62 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1(b) (New).
63 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1(a) (New).
64 CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405 (West 1955).
65 De Luna v. WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 271, 274, 65 Cal. Rptr. 421, 423 (1968). This
was the reasoning used by the court to grant recovery to the claimant for the specific
injury.
66 Miller v. WCAB, 258 A.C.A. 589, 596, 65 Cal. Rptr. 835, 839 (1968).
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disability. The court, by holding that the 1957 and 1965 injuries
contributed to the cumulative injury, allowed the appeals board to
consider the 21 Y2% and 6% permanent disability from those injuries
as a further basis for an award for the cumulative injury, which was
only rated at 124 9'o permanent disability. The result would be that
the claimant's award for cumulative injury could conceivably be
based on 39Y % permanent disability.
Today, such a decision could not stand. Section 5303 expressly
forbids any such merger of injuries for purposes of determining
awards. Also, since the injuries of 1957 and 1965 each caused dis-
ability to the employee, 21Y21% and 6% respectively, each is a
specific injury within section 3208.1. Finally, by the force of section
3208.2, any award for the cumulative injury in this case must be
founded upon evidence independent of the specific injuries of 1957
and 1965. Thus, the specific injury of 1957 would be barred by the
statute of limitations. The specific injury of 1965 would be com-
pensable since treatment for that injury extended to June 10, 1966,
and the claimant filed for compensation within one year from that
date. 7 And of course the cumulative injury claim would be com-
pensable, but limited to its own facts.
A Note on Dow Chemical
While the legislative reaction to the Miller, De Luna, and
Fruehauf cases appears to be well-founded, the attack on Dow
Chemical seems to be misdirected. Although Miller and De Luna
purport to find approbation for the "integration theory" in Dow
Chemical, that case specifically disapproved such theory."8 On the
one hand, the cumulative injury measured as occurring between
1946 and 1960 was treated as occurring in 1964 so as to make it
subsequent to the 1960 and 1961 specific injuries.69 On the other
hand, the merger theory was specifically rejected.7 0 Thus a literal
interpretation of section 5303 of the Labor Code would not reverse
Dow Chemical.71 It might be argued that the court must have con-
67 CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405 (West 1955).
68 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
69 The court appears to adopt the Beveridge rule of last exposure. It fixes "[Wihat
is by necessity a constructive date on which, for the purposes of the subsequent injury
statutes, a cumulative injury will be deemed to have occurred. That date is the last
day of the period in which the WCAB finds that cumulative injury was received by
repetitive exposure to stress or other cause; or if disability does not appear until yet
a later date, the time when the employee becomes disabled." Dow Chemical Co. v.
WCAB, 67 Cal. 2d 483, 493, 432 P.2d 365, 372, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757, 764 (1968). The
court reasoned that the foregoing would be most fair to the employee for purposes
of the subsequent injury statutes.
70 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
71 "[Plrovided, however, that no injury, whether specific or cumulative, shall,
1968]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
sidered the 1960 and 1961 injuries as contributing to the cumulative
injury of 1964, otherwise the injury would not be repetitive under
the meaning of section 3208.1 (b).72 However, the court seems to
divorce its consideration of the specific injuries from its treatment
of the cumulative injury.7" Thus Dow Chemical, at most, appears
to be a simple avoidance of the limitations period in cases involving
the subsequent injuries statutes.
CONCLUSION
Relative to the liberal construction of the judiciary, the legisla-
ture has effectively shortened the limitations period for claiming work-
men's compensation for some injuries. Although the calender period
itself has not been shortened, the legislature has forced the employee
to diagnose the industrial origin of his injuries at the time when he
immediately needs compensation. Previously, the liberal judiciary
allowed medical costs to accumulate for a long period of time until
the claimant discovered his compensation claim and filed for relief.
Although it may seem to be a burden on the employee in forcing him
to diagnose his injury, this duty has long been recognized by the
courts. As early as 1941, the courts urged that, if there were any
doubts as to compensability, the injured employee should protect
himself from the running of the statute of limitations by filing for
benefits .7
4
Although the courts may continue to review the same volume
of workmen's compensation cases, the liberality of their decisions ap-
pears to be effectively collared in regard to the area of the statute of
limitations.
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for any purpose whatsoever, merge into or form a part of another injury; nor shall
any award based on a cumulative injury include disability caused by any specific
injury or by any other cumulative injury causing or contributing to the existing dis-
ability, need for medical treatment or death." CAL. LAB. CODE § 5303 (New).
72 The examining doctor in Dow Chemical testified that, "[Aifter the 1949
incident the exacerbations to the [back] condition were too numerous to identify, and
that the 1960 and 1961 strains were simply two of the more severe incidents of
exacerbation." Dow Chemical Co. v. WCAB, 67 Cal. 2d 483, 486, 432 P.2d 365, 367,
62 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 (1967).
73 The court recognized the individuality of the two specific injuries in that the
board was precluded "from treating these two injuries as simply two incidents con-
tributing to the cumulative injury. Instead they are to be deemed as separately com-
pensable injuries." Id. at 494 n.8, 432 P.2d at 373 n.8, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 765 n.8 (1967).
74 Freire v. Matson Nay. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 10, 118 P.2d 809, 810 (1941), quoting
Schumacker v. IAC, 46 Cal. App. 2d 95, 115 P.2d 571 (1941).
